Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1992

Greg Hackford, Sherrie Hakford v. Utah Power and
Light Company, a Utah Corporation, and Western
Petroleum, Inc., a Utah Corporation, and Does I
through X : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert Gordon; David A. Westerby; Gary D. Stott; Michael K. Mohrman; Richards, Brandt, Miller
& Nelson; Attorneys for Respondents.
C. Richard Henriksen, Jr.; David M. Jorgensen; Henriksen & Henriksen; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Company, No. 920208.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4155

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

45-9
.SO
DOCKET NCtt

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GREG HACKFORD,
Plaintiff,
SHERRIE HACKFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 20208

v.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, and
WESTERN PETROLEUM, INC., a
Utah corporation,
Defendants-Respondents
and DOES I through X,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from and Order of Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge
Robert Gordon
David A. Westerby
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
P.O. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Respondent
Utah Power & Light Company
Gary D. Stott
Michael K. Mohrman
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Respondent
Western Petroleum, Inc.

C. Richard Henriksen, Jr.
David M. Jorgensen
HENRIKSEN & HENRIKSEN, P.C.
320 ISouth 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Appellant
Sherrie Hackford

MLfc
FEB 6 1965
Clerk, Supremo Court, Uah

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GREG HACKFORD,
Plaintiff,
SHERRIE HACKFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20208

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, and
WESTERN PETROLEUM, INC,, a
Utah corporation,
Defendants-Respondents
and DOES I through X,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from and Order of Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge
Robert Gordon
David A. Westerby
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
P.O. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Respondent
Utah Power & Light Company
Gary D. Stott
Michael K. Mohrman
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Respondent
Western Petroleum, Inc.

C. Richard Henriksen, Jr.
David M. Jorgensen
HENRIKSEN & HENRIKSEN, P.C,
320 ISouth 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Appellant
Sherrie Hackford

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

la-lc

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

II.

III.

IV.

2

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION DOES NOT REQUIRE
ABOLITION OF CONSORTIUM AND WOULD SUPPORT
RECOGNITION OF SUCH CLAIMS

4

A, Granting the Wife the Right to Claim
Loss of Consortium also Results in
Equalization

4

B. The Married Women's Act Was Never
Intended to Achieve Equality by
Denying Consortium Rights . . . .

6

EVALUATED IN ITS PROPER TIME FRAME, THE PRESENT
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 30-2-4 CAUSES IT TO BE
INVALID UNDER THE INJURY REDRESS PROVISION. . .

9

THE REASONS ADVANCED FOR THE CONTINUATION
FOR UTAH'S POLICY ARE NOT PERSUASIVE

12

A. The Public Policy of Compensating the
Injured for Their Damages Would be Furthered
by Recognition of this Tort

12

B. There is No Double Recovery in the Consortium
Tort, and There is No Recovery for the
Consortium Elements Through the
Primary Case

14

C. The Remaining Rationale of Black v. United
States is Not Persuasive

16

D. Defendant Utah Power & Light's Suggested
Alternative is Obviously Inappropriate
and Inadequate

17

CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT INTERPRETATION WOULD
VIOLATE STATE AND FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION
GUARANTEES

17

A. Under the Rational Basis Testr Classifications
Must be "Real" and Rationally Related to
Legitimate Government Objectives
18
1. The distinctions between classifications
cannot be fanciful

18

2. Elimination of the consortium tort does
not serve any legitimate state purpose. .

19

B. As Presently Interpreted, Section 30-2-4
is an Invidious Attack Based on Sex

20

CONCLUSION

21

APPENDICES

23

APPENDIX A - Cited Utah State
Provisions
Utah Constitution, Article
Utah Constitution, Article
Utah Constitution, Article
Utah Constitution, Article

Constitutional
I, Section 11 .
I, Section 24 .
IV,Section 1. .
XVI, Section 5.

.
.
.
.

24
24
24
24
24

APPENDIX B - Cited Provisions of the Constitution
of the United Stated of America
25
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV,
Section 1
APPENDIX C - Cited Utah Statutory Provisions. .
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-2-4
(1976)
Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-2
(1978)
APPENDIX D - Cited Provisions from the Compiled
Laws of Utah, 1888

25
26
26
26
27

Section 2528 - Compiled Laws of Utah 1888. .

27

Section 2529 - Compiled Laws of Utah 1888. .

27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTIONS
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11. . .

3,10,11,19,20,24

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24

5,17,24

Utah Constitution, Article IV, Section 1

5,6,11,24

Utah Constitution, Article XVI, Section 5

7,24

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1. . . 17,25
STATUTES
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888, Section 2529

6,27

Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888, Section 2528

6,27

Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-2 (1978)

26

Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-2-4 (1976)

9,20,21

CASES
Aderhold v. Stewart,
172 Okla. 77, 46 P.2d 346 (1935)

15

Black v. United States,
263 F. Supp. 470 (D. Utah, 1967)

15,16

Brahan & Meridian L. &. P. Company,
121 Miss 269, 83 So. 467 (1917)
Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches,
88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 25 (1953);
Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313, 51 L. Ed.2d 360,
97 S. Ct. 1192 (1977)
Craig

v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 50 L. Ed.2d 397, 97 S.Ct.
451 (1976)

Dillon v. Legg,
68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
441 P.2d 912 (1968)
Dini v. Naiditch,
170 N.E.2d 881, 86 A.L.R. 2d 1184 (111., 1960) . . .

15
5

20

20

7
15

1

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 31 L. Ed.
2d 274, 92 S.Ct. 995 (1972)

20,21

Ellis v. Hathaway,
27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P.2d 986 (1972)

10

Gregory v Oakland Motor Car Company,
181 Mich 101, 147 N.W. 614 (1914)

15

Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska, 1977)
reversed on other grounds 437 U.S. 518,
57 L.Ed. 2d 397, 98 S.Ct. 2482 (1978)

21

Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,
183 F.2d 811 (D.C. App., 1950)
Hoekstra v. Helgeland,
98 N.W.2d 669 (S.D., 1959)

5,15
5,9

Hoffman v. Dautel,
388 P.2d 615 (Kan., 1964)

5

In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 37 L.Ed.2d 910,
93a. S.Ct. 2851 (1973)

20

Leong v. Takasaki,
520 P.2d 758 (Haw., 1974)

7

Lindsay v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co.
90 P.984 (Idaho, 1907)

8

Malan v. Lewis,
No. 17606 (Utah, May 1, 1984)
Matthew v. Central Pacific Railroad Co.,
63 Cal. 450 (1883)
McGinnis, Commissioner of Correction et. al. v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263, 35 L.Ed.2d 282,
93 S.Ct. 1055 (1973)
Mewhirter v. Hatten,
42 Iowa 288, 20 Am. Rep. 618 (1875)

18
8

19
9

Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co.,
22 N.Y.2d 498, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 239 N.E.2d 897,
36 A.L.R.3d 891 (1968)
8,13,14,15
Montgomery v. Stephan,
101 N.W.2d 227, (Mich., 1960)
Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co.,
150 N.W.2d 137 (Wis., 1967)
1b.

9
15

Omaha and Republican Valley Railroad Co, v. Chollette,
59 N.E. 921 (Neb., 1894)
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 30 L. Ed.2d 225,
92 S.Ct. 251 (1971)
Robinson v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.,
69 N.Y.S. 891, 34 Misc. 795 (1901)
Standen v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
63 A.467 (Pa., 1906)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Harper and James, Law of Torts,
section 8.9 p.638
41 Am. Jr. 2d "Husband and Wife",
Section 17
21 A.L.R. 1519 "Husband's Right to Damages for Loss of
Consortium," supplemented 133 A.L.R. 1157. . . .

1c.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GREG HACKFORD,
Plaintifff
SHERRIE HACKFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20208

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, and
WESTERN PETROLEUM, I N C , a
Utah corporation,
Defendants-Respondents
and DOES I through X,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants' argument that the purpose of Utah's Married
Womens's Act was to "place a husband and wife on equal footing"
presumes that the critical ambiguous language of Utah's Married
Women's Act should be interpreted in the way that it has been
interpreted.

Plaintiff asserts that the language at issue simply

clears up the questions then existing concerning whether the
husband could bring an action on behalf of his wife or whether he
could or had to join in an action brought by the wife.

The language

was not intended to remove any separate rights which the husband had
for his own injuries under common law, and even if "complete"

equalization were a purpose of the Married Women's Act, a recognition of the consortium claims of both spouses would accomplish that
task in addition to its clear primary purpose of removing all the
common law disabilities from married women.
Defendants' argument that no problem with Article I
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution exists is based upon court
decisions of the 1960's and 1970fs which were based upon the very
legislation in question rather than the state of the law prior to
1898.

Both the statutory construction and Married Women's legisla-

tion would have to comply with the appropriate constitutional provisions , and resolution of some of the Constitutional questions
requires inquiry into the situation existing in 1898 and before.
Unquestionably, consortium was an integral part of the
pre-1898 common law.

Even where emancipation acts had been enacted,

the overwhelming majority of United States court decisions continued
to recognize and have continued to recognize the husband's consortium interest.

Even the wife's consortium interest had been recog-

nized at that time in the intentional tort context.

Nothing

indicates that a Utah court would have decided prior to 1898 to
disavow the common law as it then existed in this country.

In fact,

the decisions relied upon by defendants recognize that in Utah prior
to 1898, a husband's right to consortium existed.
Whatever the common law origins of consortium, the
consortium interest is now recognized as a real interest deserving
judicial support.

It is no longer viewed as a relic.

The basic

purpose of our tort system of allowing people to be compensated for
their injuries far outweighs the various objections to consortium
which defendants have asserted.

With respect to equal protection concerns, it is not
enough, even under the rational basis test, to point out distinctions between categories.

The distinctions have to be real and

rationally related to some valid governmental objective.

Under our

State Constitution, elimination of a common law claim for such
reasons as defendants have advocated, is not such an objective.
With sex classification, much more stringent standards
apply.

Although equality results by denying rights to both spouses,

0&£*r the relevant language of the Married Women's Act, if it is to
continue to be interpreted as it has been, applies only to the
husband, and equality results only by eliminating male rights not
related to the emancipation ojective.

Under such an interpretation,

the Act is directed at one sex on its face.

Since equality can be

achieved without taking away a husband's claim by recognizing similar rights for the wife, the discriminatory language does not survive the stricter test applied to sex-based discrimination.
I.

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION DOES NOT REQUIRE ABOLITION OF
CONSORTIUM AND WOULD SUPPORT RECOGNITION OF SUCH
CLAIMS
The purpose of the Married Women's Acts was to free women

from their common law disabilities, 41 Am. Jr. 2d "Husband and
Wife", Section 17. As the period of time which passed between
passage of the Married Women's Acts and the recognition of their
right to maintain a consortium illustrates, there was no expressed
intent to "equalize" all aspects of the male-female relationship,
although much intended equalization occurred with emancipation.
A.

Granting the Wife the Right to Claim Loss of
Consortium also Results in Equalization.

Any "complete equalizing" intent is as adequately
accomplished by bringing both spouses up to the same level as by
reducing one spouse's rights.

Indeed, numerous courts have answered

the contention that no action for a wife's loss of consortium existed
at common law by asserting that however demeaning the wife's
position was at ancient common law, by the time the Married Women's
Acts began to be enacted, the woman's condition had improved to the
point that she had a recognized interest in the "marriage relationship" as evidenced by the recognition of her right to maintain an
action for intentional alienation.

See the discussion in Hoekstra

v. Helgeland, 98 N.W. 2d 669 (S.D., 1959).

In addition, other

inroads into the disabilities of the medieval common law had been
accomplished by statute.

As a result, the view has been stated that

during the relevant time period just before and around the time that
Married Women's Acts were being enacted, the wife had the lawful
right to the consortium of the husband, but simply could not maintain a claim while the relationship existed because of those disabilities of coverture which still remained.

Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98

N.W.2d 669, 673-679, 681-682 (S.D., 1959); Brown v. GeorgiaTennessee Coaches, 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1953);
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. App., 1950); see
also Hoffman v. Dautel, 388 P.2d 615, 619 (Kan., 1964) where the
analysis is succinctly articulated but not agreed to by that court.
The particularly strong constitutional protection provided
by Article 1 Section 24 and Article 4 Section 1 of the Utah
Constitution makes the analysis not followed by the Kansas court
but approved by the others, especially appropriate to Utah.

In this respect, Utah's equal rights provision contained
in Article 4 Section 1, deserves special mention.

The only Utah

cases that plaintiff is aware of dealing with this section, relate to
voting.

But voting and the right to hold office are guaranteed by

the first sentence of Article 4 Section 1, and the second sentence
goes on to more broadly guaranty rights by stating that both sexes
shall "enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and
privileges." (emphasis added).

The application of this Constitu-

tional provision should be interpreted by the words it uses and not
just the captions around it, and the most plausible reading of the
second sentence of Article 4 Section 1 would include in its results
married women having the right to maintain an action for loss of
consortium the day our Utah Constitution came into effect since
married men had the same right under common law.
B.

The Married Women's Act Was Never Intended to Achieve
Equality by Denying Consortium Rights.
To argue that the Married Women's Act was designed to

put husbands and wives on a "completely equal" basis, ignores the
interpretation issue.
Equalizing and emancipating, (or in Utah's case, more
fully emancipating as far as legislation is concerned) , are relcited

*

The territorial legislature had enacted some incomplete laws
covering domestic relations. Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888,
Section 2529, provided that "either spouse may sue or be sued" but
did not address the joinder question then existing, at least in
community property states, on personal injury claims and could
well be interpreted of giving the right to sue to either or both
spouses. Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888 Section 2528 provided that
property acquired by either spouse before marriage and certain
property , not including personal injury claims, acquired after
the marriage relationship was property of that spouse and could be
dealt with as separate property during the marriage or otherwise.
*T__. i_i
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legislature was only considering those damage elements that would
give the wife full compensation for her own injuries.

As is dis-

cussed in plaintiff's original brief and later herein, the elements
which comprise the consortium claim are totally different from
anything that the physically injured wife, suing for her own
injuries, would be compensated for.

Millington v. Southeastern

Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 239 N.E.2d 897, 899,
36 A.L.R.3d 891, 893 (1968).
The statutory wording needs to be examined in light of
conditions existing at the time the statutes were enacted.

Under

the common law, a husband had to file a claim for the wife's
injuries, and it was the law in other jurisdictions around the turn
of the century that had not enacted the comprehensive Married
Women's Acts that we see today that the husband could maintain his
own actions to recover medical expenses and loss of earning capacity
when the wife was injured, e.g., Robinson v. Metropolitan St. Ry.
Co., 69 N.Y.S. 891, 34 Misc. 795 (1901); see also Standen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 63 A.467 (Pa., 1906).

In some community property

states, at least, the wife had to be joined by her husband, unless
they were separated, e.g. Matthew v. Central Pacific Railroad Co.f
63 Cal. 450 (1883); Lindsay v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 90
P.984 (Idaho, 1907).

The pre-1898 Utah territorial statutes did not

settle questions such as these either.

Plaintiff asserts that the

particular wording of Utah's Married Women's Act was intended simply
to make it clear that not only could the wife sue for her own
injuries, but that she alone could bring that suit.
Complete equality as opposed to complete removal of common
law disabilities was not the purpose of our Married Women's Act.

F i^4-^ -r

-**.- > : / ^

injuria,

^.

*, O ^ J ^ - vi/o .:-J

curnstance^-

s 2 -1: v *

^uitpcusdiiu

'-li-

:*> -»r» a

irital

sha^^

f^ot;:

relationshi :

-.(--.

f

*

ufiJ

c i s a b i 1 i i~v lr s h o u l d

. J degrading

is

*"- ^ * :' f

- s i ji.eL* a s
able

equal

^oouse

. >•»* * ^-

vomer

*

* r M

be u s e d a s a

* *•• '

MO

. :equit-

"bwoi 1

.0

>* v p r v >^ar~

. :r^

EVALUATED
_ TS FhOP^R ."Hr. FRAME, T'ih P K F ^ F N T
INTERPRETATION OF SECTT'N J O - 2 - 4 CAUSES IT
BE TNVaTm nxim?i> ^ T, .* ^
"^DRESS PROVISION,
Consoi. <„ i ,ui
law

£o

^n

<

H o e k s t , vA ,
statutory
that-

. i -j :>-• -r, p *r t
^d^ -•^ 1 u t h o r i *

langu

f

- Enc 1 i ^r. - * J: • .
1

.*
- l i r r i e d Wome.

,

oserr

* ,j -

-

-

i o r a 1

far*

numbet

*thafc

valley
: rre

» • .

Railroad

decided

••

Co.

v.

befor-

?

',*
the
4

^ *

»• -

- *

. - J:.
erwr

-filing

dec
^

^ ,

,

u 3

Omaha a n d

n^^

Repub-

Chollette

-latt>-

-

r

*ih,c5

-*;

hi nn^<=«

.,

> •

-

wordmc

M.:J-

-~—

Plaintil-t

law

1

" e c o g r u / . • • • ' i * *a ^

*_-

brougtv

lv
.

.^

holding

.wOimon

-

»cx^»ri ( aj.

of

1960

o*

ji

a:

Utah's

refuse

t.

-laims
1

.

Mat - -• : W o m e n ' s A c t w h i ^ h

c u . . j . .*..,, v o ^

- ^ i s o r t i n.

x ~
,

j

re-lfc'*^

,-ievant

statutory

ha*- c a u s e d

- •* - *

ceivable that prior to 1898, the highest Utah court would not have
recognized a consortium claim had the issue been presented.

In

fact, the existance of a husband's claim would not even have been
questioned.

Under these circumstances, it would not take a

declaration of Utah's highest court to let us know what the common
law was.

Further, it is inconsistent to argue that the legislature

intended to eliminate the consortium right and to also maintain that
no such right existed.
Although plaintiff disputes the statutory interpretation
of the Married Women's Act assumed in Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d
143, 493 P.2d 986 (1972), by asserting that the women had no right
to consortium at common law and that the ambiguous wording of the
Married Woman's Act at issue here "placed husband and wife on an
equal basis", this Court recognized that prior to the effective date
of the 1898 Acts, a husband had the right to maintain a loss of
consortium claim.

Judge Christensen also recognized the obvious in

Black v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 470 (D. Utah, 1967) when he
stated that the interpretation of Utah's Married Women's Act which
plaintiff asserts is the most logical and only Constitutionally
permissible construction

would result in a "resuscitation of the

common law rule". :id. at 480.

It is only the interpretation of the

Married Women's Act that has caused consortium not to have been
recognized in Utah at the appellate level, and this Court and the
U.S. District Court clearly realized that a husband's pre-1898
rights included consortium.
One of the points of plaintiff's original brief was
that the Injury Redress provision found in Article I Section 11 of

the
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If the husband's rights cannot

be taken away, the expressed reason for denying those same rights to
the wife disappears.
III.
A.

THE REASONS ADVANCED FOR THE CONTINUATION FOR UTAH'S
POLICY ARE NOT PERSUASIVE.
The Public Policy of Compensating the Injured for
Their Damages Would be Furthered by Recognition
of this Tort.
Defendant Utah Power & Light lists reasons which have been

advanced from time to time against consortium claims generally.

The

short answer to this litany is that it has been rejected with virtual unanimity by the states, and for good reason.

There is no

indication that meaningful difficulties have been encountered in
these states in affecting settlements or judicial resolutions
because of consortium claims.
Virtually all of the concerns voiced by defendants simply
require the court to make a decision.

In most of the cases, the

particular way that the court eventually chooses to resolve a legal
question will not have any impact beyond actual litigants who do not
follow the court's decision on how such questions are to be
resolved.
In answer to defendants' concern that there is no
stopping point for awarding compensation for injuries to a relationship once a court decides to allow consortium claims, not only is
the marriage relationship clearly distinguishable historically,
sociologically and legally from all the others cited by defendants,
but it is simply not wise decisional policy for a court to fail to
make the right decision on a case before it based upon allegations
that it will not be able to control itself when faced with different
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ship, affection, society, sexual relations, and solace are certainly
deserving of compensation.

The Court stated:

Disparagingly described as 'sentimental1 or
'parasitic' damages, the mental and emotional
anguish caused by seeing a healthy loving companionable mate turned into a shell of a person is real
enough. To describe the loss as 'indirect' is
only to evade the issue. The loss of
companionship, emotional support, love, felicity
and sexual relations are real injuries. The
trauma of having to care for a permanent invalid
is known to have caused mental illness...Even
in the case of a husband the 'sentimental' damages
may predominate over the loss of support or
material element. Thus to describe these damages
as merely parasitic is inaccurate and cruel...
It is also contended that the 'sentimental'
damages such as the diminution of the value of her
husband's society and affection and the
deprivation of sexual relationship and the
attendant loss of child-bearing opportunity are
too personal, intangible, and conjectural to be
measured in pecuniary terms by a jury. The
argument has no merit. The logic of it would also
hold a jury incompetent to award damages for pain
and suffering.
Money is a poor substitute for the loss of a child
or the pain resulting from serious injuries.
Likewise, it cannot truly compensate a wife for
the destruction of her marrige, but it is the only
known means to compensate for the loss suffered
and to symbolize society's recognition that a
culpable wrong - even if unintentionl - has been
done. (239 N.E.2d 897, 899, 902)
Whatever its ancient origins, "consortium now represents
the interest of the injured party's spouse in the continuance of a
healthy and happy marital life." Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897, 900.

Once this is recognized, "it

becomes evident that the cause of action is not a relic."
B.

Id.

There is No Double Recovery in the Consortium Tort,
and There is No Recovery for the Consortium Elements
Through the Primary Case.
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Any
4 J L ^ auable recovery...can be avoided
by a e
^ from the computation of damages in
t h e c<
~ium action any compensation given her
husbanu ni his action for the impairment of his
ability to support... Since the possibility of
double recovery can be eliminated by the simple
adjustment of damages, it should not constitute
a basis for denying [the wife's] action, which
includes many elements which are in no way compensable in the husband's action. Millington v.
Southeastern Elevator Co., supra, 239 N.E.2d
897, 899, 36 A.L.R.3d 891, 893 (1968). (Emphasis
was added in the Millington case but was not in

the other cases from which the quote was
taken).
C.

The Remaining Rationale of Black v. United States
is Not Persuasive,
Defendants rely heavily on Judge Christensen's considered

opinion in Black v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 470 (D. Ut., 1967).
Placed in the difficult position of having to guess what Utah's law
might be, and not having been presented with all the issues that are
involved, Judge Christensen took an understandably conservative
approach.

His concerns about double damages and unlimited recogni-

tion of other types of claims in different types of relationships
have been discussed, as has the ambiguity present in Utah's Married
Women's Act.
Judge Christensen recognized the ambiguity present in
Utah's Married Women's Act.

Admittedly, he resolved that ambiguity

against consortium, but his uncertainies were such that he had to
rely upon such things as his experience to resolve it.

Before

formerly recognized consortium rights are abolished, the intent to
do so should be clear.

Omaha and Republican Valley Railroad Com-

pany v. Chollette, 59 N.W. 921, 925 (Neb. 1894).

At the very least,

our statute is not clear.
However appropriate it may have been for a Federal
District Judge

finding himself in his position to rely upon

personal experience, the number of reported consortium claims
raised in both the Federal District Court and this Court actually
reported and cited by defendants demonstrate the weakness of the
rationale.

Moreover, this court is in the position of making such

determinations without the need to depend on informal perceptions of
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Defendant Utah Power & Light's Suggested Alternative
is Obviously Inappropriate and Inadequate.
Utah Power & I ,i ght l s suggested alternative to consortium.
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wNTINUATION OF THE PRESENT INTERPRETATION WOULD
•IOLATE STATE AND FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION
GUARANTEES.
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States Constitution, place restrictions on governmental exercise
of authority in passing legislation.
In the case of Malan v. Lewis, No. 17606 (Utah, May 1,
1984) the Utah Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, stated concerning these restrictions:
Basic principles of equal protection of the law
are inherent in the very concept of juctice and
are a necessary attribute of a just society. Id.
at 12.
A.

1.

Under the Rational Basis Test, Classifications
Must be "Real" and Rationally Related to Legitimate
Government Objectives.

The distinctions between classifications cannot be fanciful.
It is difficult to imagine any thing or category that

cannot be distinguished in some way from another thing or category.
As a result, to be valid, classifications must be based on "real
distinctions" and not on artificial or irrelevant ones.

Malan v.

Lewis, No. 17606 (Utah, May 1, 1984).
Defendants' argument that a valid distinction can be found
between intentional alienation of affections, and consortium reveals
a distinction without a legally meaningful difference.

The mere fact

that only one person suffers a legal injury in the intentional tort
case, while both suffer in a negligent tort case is merely a descriptive distinction devoid of legal significance.

Indeed, as the

state of the law in the United States reveals, of the two torts, the
consortium tort is clearly the most relevant to today's society, and
it is consortium rather than intentional alienation of the
affections that is recognized as the more meaningful by today's
legal community.

2. Elimination of the consortium tort does not serve any legitimate
state purpose.
To pass equal protection muster, classifications must be
rationally related to a "legitimate articulated state purpose."
McGinnis, Commissioner of Correction et. al. v. Royster, 410 U.S.
263, 270, 35 L.Ed.2d 282, 288, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1059 (1973).
With respect to the wrongful death situation, plaintiff
concedes the need to fully and adequately compensate heirs who
suffer as a result of a wrongful death, especially in light of
Utah's Constitutional wrongful death command.

As a result, plain-

tiff does not argue that the distinction between wrongful death and
consortium is anything but real.

What plaintiff does argue is that

both in comparison to wrongful death situations and in the alienation of affections situation, no legitimate governmental purpose
is served by treating the negligent loss of consortium any
differently in the two kinds of cases.
As has been discussed, the purpose of the Married Women's
Act was to legislatively remove common law disabilities and the
purpose of the Wrongful Death Act is to compensate heirs. Neither
of these purposes is furthered by denying the consortium claim to a
spouse who must deal with a severely injured but living companion.
In addition, given the protection embodied in Article I,
Section 11, and given the fact that "complete" equality, (even if
that were a purpose of the Married Women's Act), could be achieved
without destroying the husband's common law consortium claim by
recognizing it in the wife, something more stringent than a showing
of any conceivable rational basis ought to be required.

To be sure,

common law tort rights are not fundamental rights under U.S. Constitutional law, but under Utah's Constitution, a greater showing of
need than what has been shown should be required under an equal
protection concept, regardless of the way in which the legal questions might be resolved under Article 1 section 11 itself.
B.

As Presently Interpreted, Section 30-2-4 is an
Invidious Attack Based on Sex.

By its express terms, if interpreted as it has been,
Section 30-2-4 is directed at the husband because of his sex.

Sex

classification is subject to scrutiny under equal protection
clauses.

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75,30 L. Ed.2d 225, 92 S.Ct.

251 (1971).

The fact that the classification discriminates against

men rather than women does not protect it from scrutiny.

Craig

v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 50 L. Ed.2d 397, 97 S.Ct. 451 (1976).

To

withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-317, 51 L. Ed.2d 360, 97 S.
Ct. 1192 (1977).
When a strict scrutiny test is applicable, the proponent
of the statute must show that the purpose of the statute is "constitutionally permissible and substantial" and that the classification is "necessary...to the accomplishment of its purpose."
In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722, 37 L.Ed.2d 910, 915, 93a. S.Ct.
2851, 2855 (1973).

If there are alternative means available which

achieve a legislation's goals without the intrusion or discrimination complained of, the state must choose the "less drastic means."
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274, 284-85,

92 S.Ct. 995, 1003-04 (1972); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 163
(Alaska, 1977) reversed on other grounds 437 U.S. 518, 57 L.Ed. 2d
397, 98 S.Ct. 2482 (1978).
Certainly emancipating women from common law disabilities
meets these tests.

But achieving "completeM equality (even if that

were the purpose)

by the removal of common law rights of the other

sex, when' it is not necessary to take away rights to achieve that
equality, could not possibly withstand "scrutiny" or "strict
scrutiny."

The alternative of recognizing the right in the other

spouse to achieve equality being available, accepted, and in strict
conformity with recognized public policy, the taking away of a
husband's right just so that equality will be achieved at a lower
level cannot withstand the strict test which exists for sex-based
discrimination.
The result obtained by following the present interpretation of Section 30-2-4 is not even like the constitutionallyquestionable affirmative action programs where some taking from one
group is necessary to help a group that society has discriminated
against.

In the consortium area, taking is not necessary to achieve

equality.

The mere fact that equality is reached does not mean that

equal protection concerns are satisfied as the dispute over the
constitutionality of affirmative action illustrates.

Discrimina-

tion cannot be allowed when equality can be achieved without it.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is aware of the arguments raised in opposition
in consortium claims in general and to Utah consortium claims in
particular.

Plaintiff asserts, however, that none of those reasons

are compelling and that they should not be used to keep damages to
the marital relationship suffered in Utah uncompensable.

Moreover,

following the continued interpretation of Utah's Married Women's
Act places that Act in conflict with fundamental Constitutional
protections.
DATED thi
tis _^
/^

. of '^thiO^.
^
day

, 1985,

HENRfKSEN & HENRIKSEN, P.C.
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Appendix A
Cited Utah State Constitutional Provisions

I,

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel any civil cause to which he is a
party.

II.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform

operation.

III.

Utah Constitution, Article IV, Section 1

The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and
hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.
Both male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally
all civil, political and religious rights and privileges.

IV.

Utah Constitution, Article XVI, Section 5

The right of action to recover damages for injuries
resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount
recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation,
except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in
death is provided for by law.

24

appendix B
Cited Provisions of the Constitution
of the United States of America

Amendment XIV, Seciton 1 of the United States Constitution
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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Appendix C

Cited Utah Statutory Provisions
I.

Utah Code Ann. Section 30-2-4 (1976)

A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor,
maintain an action therefor in her own name and hold the same in
her own right, and may prosecute and defend all actions for the
preservation and protection of her rights and property as if
unmarried. There shall be no right of recovery by the husband on
account of personal injury or wrong to his wifef or for expenses
connected therewithf but the wife may recover against a third
person for such injury or wrong as if unmarriedf and such
recovery shall include expenses of medical treatment and other
expenses paid or assumed by the husband.
II.

Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-2 (1978)

The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the
statutes of this state. The statutes establish the laws of this
state respecting the subjects to which they relatef and their
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally
construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and
to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance between the
rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the
same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
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Appendix D

Cited Provisions from the Compiled
Laws of Utah, 1888
I.

Section 2528 of the Complied Laws of Utah, 1888

All property owned by either spouse before marriage,
and that acquired afterwards by purchase, gift, bequest, devise
or descent, with the rents, issues and profits thereof, is the
separate property of that spouse by whom the same is so owned or
acquired, and separate property owned or acquired as specified
above, may be held, managed, controlled, transferred and in any
manner disposed of by the spouse so owning or acquiring it,
without any limitation or restriction by reason of marriage.
II.

Section 2529 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888

Either spouse may sue or be sued, plead and be
impleaded, or defend and be defended at law.
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